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Abstract 
Based on real-world examples of identity theft, and particularly a recent incident in 
Sweden, this paper explores the nature of identification from a social ontology point of 
view. This is contrasted with the traditional representational view, which is shown 
unable to handle critical aspects related to institutional control of identifiers and 
identity. Specifically, the paper shows that identification and the definition and 
allocation of identifiers is an institutional and political rather than scientific process, 
and that since “identity” in itself is a social construct, the process of identification 
depends on the institutional context in which the objects to identify exist as valid 
institutional facts. These institutional objects are often originally generated by the use of 
information systems, which means that genuine real-world institutional objects and 
their identifiers can be found within these information systems. This implies that the 
representational view of information systems with a sharp distinction between the real 
world outside the information system and the system itself (only seen as a model or 
perceived state of that real world) cannot be maintained. 
Keywords: Conceptual modelling, Information infrastructure, Identity theft, Ontology 
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Introduction 
As he approached his dark-blue Toyota Auris, Lars could not help noticing something unusual. In the 
brisk autumn morning his car appeared somehow different. Something was missing. At first he could not 
tell just what. Then suddenly it dawned upon him. Instead of the license plate, all he could discern was a 
vacuous space. Why would someone take someone’s license plates, he thought to himself while rushing 
back inside to look up the number to the local police and the road administration authorities. He stopped 
to catch his breath, called the police to report the theft and then went on to ordering a new set of plates 
from the road administration. He received the new plates in a heartbeat and everything seemed fine. 
About a month later he also received a letter from the police stating that they had found a burnt-out car 
carrying his license plates and that this car was now going to the scrap yard. Everything still seemed fine. 
Well. Everything was fine until Lars one day received 13 parking tickets. He had used his car very sparsely 
lately. It had in fact been parked in front of his house most of the time so how could it be? It turned out 
that the tickets were for the burnt-out car and not his. Bummer. As if this was not enough, shortly after 
the tickets he also received a letter from the insurance company bluntly stating that his car insurance 
policy was void. According to the notice, his blue Toyota no longer existed. How odd, he could clearly see 
the sparklingly blue car parked in the driveway. He pondered, “if it doesn’t exist, although I’m pretty sure 
it does, can I still use it or would that perhaps violate some regulations? I guess I better not since 
apparently it is no longer insured. How could this happen? Why?” 
This slightly dramatized narrative is based on a true story that recently unfolded in Sweden (Sjöberg, 
2010). In the paper we use this case as a backdrop to discuss the nature of identifiers (such as license 
numbers), identification and its implications, particularly in relation to information systems and identity 
management. Indeed, the story may seem innocent enough and the company running the car breaker’s 
yard eventually took responsibility and sent a letter to the Swedish Road Administration (SRA) explaining 
the situation and asking them to re-register Lars’ Toyota. However, identity theft is clearly not a harmless 
activity, and the story goes to show that today’s information society is frighteningly vulnerable when it 
comes to identifying, and managing the identity of things with far-reaching economical, legal and social 
implications. Lars, who certainly was not too happy about the whole situation (Sjöberg, 2010), became 
painfully aware of this and others have lived through similar experiences, also in other parts of the world 
(e.g. K, 2010).  
In what follows we will explore how and why the traditional information systems development (ISD) 
literature with its foundation in a representational view of information systems fails to recognize the 
importance of institutional control of identifiers and identities in relationship to information systems. The 
aim is to form a basis upon which to construct ontological model for information systems design that 
acknowledges that information systems are tools for social interaction and that such systems are part of 
the world and not simply representations of a material world external to the systems.  
In the ISD literature identifiers generated within information systems are typically considered to be 
meaningless technical constructs (surrogates) that represent the natural key or the set of identifying 
properties that actually identifies a thing in the real world (Date, 2004, p. Codd, 1979; Wieringa and 
Jonge, 1991; Evermann and Wand, 2005). However, this straightforward technical understanding of 
identifiers is problematic because it does not reflect the social and institutional meaning of the identifier 
construct. Nor does it reflect the social context of its use, its ontological status or its fundamental role for 
information infrastructures and society. This implies that the ISD literature gives little advice concerning 
identity management routines. Improper identity management is a main reason for escalating problems 
related to identifiers and identification, which cause significant costs to people, organizations and society 
(LoPucki 2001; Baum, 2004; Eriksson and Ågerfalk, 2010;) due to lack of institutional control. Drawing 
on Searle’s (2006) social ontology and Eriksson and Ågerfalk’s (2010) concept of the institutional object 
and understanding of the identifier construct, we present an alternative approach to address 
contemporary information systems problems. In keeping with Iannacci (2010), the proposed approach 
emphasizes the importance of constitutive rules in the process of institutionalization. As such, it can be 
seen to rest on the cultural-cognitive pillar of institutional theory (Scott, 2001; 2003) in which institutions 
are conceived of as systems of constitutive rules that govern the existence of identity as social fact and the 
validity of what we refer to as institutional objects. To paraphrase Scott (2003), our attention is directed 
to the shared conceptions that constitute the nature of socio-material reality and provide the symbolic 
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frames that support social sense making in an information systems (IS) context. In the paper we adopt a 
conceptual-analytical research approach (Järvinen, 2000), which means that we provide analytical and 
logical arguments based on real world examples. The real-world example with the stolen vehicle identifier 
is used to illustrate that identification and identity is a matter of a collective acknowledgement of 
institutional objects, which is based on constitutive rules and routines in a certain institutional context, 
and that genuine real-world institutional objects can be generated and exist within information systems. 
This is important to understand in order to discuss the ontological status of identifiers and information 
systems.  
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents an analysis of the case of the stolen vehicle 
identifier introduced above. The analysis is performed in two phases. In the first phase, the traditional, 
representational view of information is adopted. The second phase then applies an alternative, social 
ontology perspective. The third section elaborates on the problems with identifiers and the objects they 
identify. The fourth section discusses the implications for information systems in more general terms, and 
the fifth section concludes the paper. 
The Problem with the Stolen Vehicle Identifier 
For the purpose of analysis, the case of the stolen vehicle identifier can be described in terms of a number 
of critical actions:   
A-1. The license plates of Lars’ blue Toyota Auris are reported stolen. 
A-2. New license plates are produced and delivered to Lars who mounts them on his car. 
A-3. Burnt-out car with Lars’ stolen license plates is demolished and the traffic vehicle is de-registered.  
A-4. Lars’ insurance policy is cancelled. 
In order to understand the problem it should be clarified that to have a Swedish car insured it has to be 
registered in the Central Vehicle Registry (CVR), which at that time was the responsibility of the SRA. In 
the CVR, vehicles are described and identified by their license number, ISO-VIN number , vehicle type, 
model, model year, first date of registration, body, length, width, number of passengers, motor effect, total 
weight, and tax weight. The vehicle object would typically be represented in a relational table and the 
attributes of the vehicle would be columns in such a table (see Table 1). 
A Representational Explanation 
The traditional view commonly adopted in information systems research has a strictly representational 
focus and is typically underpinned by scienticism and (dialectical) materialism (Wyssusek, 2006), 
spearheaded by the seminal work of Wand and Weber (1990; 1995). From a representational point-of-
view, the object in Table 1 should be considered as representing a thing in the real world outside the 
information system (IS), i.e. it is though of as a state tracking mechanism (Wand and Weber, 1995). The 
table can be used to inform users about the real world without them having to observe it directly. This 
view emphasizes correspondence between a domain (the universe of discourse) and its representation in 
the IS (Lyytinen 1987). This is how information systems and information stored in databases are typically 
conceived in the ISD literature. Date (2004, p. 291) confirms this view when acknowledging that “It was 
Codd’s very great insight, when he invented the relational model back in 1969, that a database is not really 
just a collection of data (despite the name) rather it is a collection of facts, or what logicians call true 
propositions.” 
Based on the representational view, the situation can be explained by saying that the insurance company 
and the SRA had an unjustified belief because the vehicle obviously existed as a physical thing in the real 
world that possessed the property of having a license plate with the license number “KHH901” printed on 
it. This implies that the CVR did not represent the real world in a true way because it contained a false 
proposition, caused by A-3; the proposition in the database did not correspond to the material world 
outside the system. Consequently, the only thing needed would be to insert a new object (row) into the 
database with the value “KHH901” in the license number column that better represents the status of the 
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real world outside the system. It appears to be a simple correction of the information stored in the 
database. 
But how should this correction be made? If the CVR with its objects is only considered a model of the 
outside real world, it is uncertain whether or not the CVR really is in an incorrect state. It is true that the 
burnt-out car was demolished. It is equally true that it possessed the mutual property “KHH901”. 
Considering these facts the CVR is indeed correct and nothing should be done. The question, then is how 
do we know which of the two license numbers were the genuine one, the one possessed by the burnt-out 
car or the one possessed by the Blue Toyota?  How do we identify the correct vehicle in this case given that 
the two vehicles possess the same identifying property? According to (Wand and Wang, 1996, p. 92) this is 
a garbling situation, caused by an operational flaw that is beyond the scope of data quality concerns: 
“analysis of design and operational flaws does not encompass the case where the user perceives a ‘wrong’ 
state of the real world (either by error or due to malicious intent). This is because the information system 
is only required to enable mapping into perceived states, not ‘real’ states.” 
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An Explanation Based on Social Ontology 
If information systems are considered to be tools for performing language acts to create objects that are as 
real as the physical world, the problem and the questions asked above can be explained quite differently. 
Based on social ontology it can be maintained that the insurance company is correct because they are not 
denying that a physical vehicle exists. They do deny, though, that there is a traffic vehicle because a 
genuine traffic vehicle can only exist in the CVR. The reason for this is that Traffic Vehicles are 
instantiated at the SRA using the CVR performing an act of registration more or less automatically, 
following a certain statute (SFS, 2001:650), which have been issued by the Swedish government. This 
registration act at the SRA is an important declarative speech act (language act), and creates three 
important objects: the Registration, Traffic Vehicle and Owner objects. The Traffic Vehicle (Table 1) table 
must therefore be complemented with an explicit Registration Act table (Table 2) and an Owner table 
(Table 3) to provide the full picture. 
This registration act is performed under the authority of the SRA and as such these objects do not only 
carry semantic meaning, they also carry deontic meaning—they are used for instantiating responsibilities, 
rights, obligations and commitments. The instantiation of a traffic vehicle means that a physical thing is 
related to the traffic vehicle object. By virtue of this, that physical vehicle becomes allowed for use on 
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public roads. Furthermore, being an owner of a traffic vehicle gives the registered owner the right to sign a 
car insurance policy for the physical vehicle. It also incurs a commitment to pay road tax.   
 
Table 2: Traffic Vehicle Registration Act table 
Action No Action Date Action Type License No Owner 
11234768 1996-02-29 Registration KHH901 123982839 
12647688 2005-05-19 De-registration KHH901 123982839 
 
Table 3: Owner table 
Owner_ID Name Street Address City Postal Code 
123982839 Lars Kjellman Finn Malmgrens väg 81  Johanneshov 121 50 
 
All three tables are required in order to represent the complete act of registering a traffic vehicle at the 
SRA. Considering Table 2, it is important to see that there is an identifier (the Action No) of the 
registration act as such. Essentially, the registration act instantiates itself and the institutional objects 
Owner and Traffic Vehicle. Neither the genuine traffic vehicle object nor the genuine owner object exist 
outside the system because the CVR is the means for assigning the rights and responsibilities that is 
represented by the Traffic Vehicle and Owner objects. Although a certificate is printed out and sent to the 
owner to verify the ownership of the traffic vehicle object, this is only a copy, a representation, of the 
reality constituted by the CVR. The certificate is part of the CVR, and a precondition for its creation is that 
a Traffic vehicle object already exists. The physical things outside the system are a physical person and a 
physical car that should conform to the rights and responsibilities that have been assigned to them. 
Effectively, these rights and responsibilities are represented by the reference to the license number and 
the owner identifier in the RegistrationAct table (Table 2). The registration act table is also used for 
performing and storing information about deregistration acts, which withdraw the rights and 
responsibilities that were previously assigned, and this is what happened in this case. In performing A-3, 
the car breaker firm invalidated the Traffic Vehicle instance in the CVR, which certified car breaker firms 
in Sweden are allowed to do. Upon realizing their mistake, however, they could not just reverse the 
change to the database, which is something only the SRA is allowed to do. Re-registrations follow a strict 
procedure in which the car breaker firm that performed the de-registration act has to explain the 
particular circumstances. SRA then approves and performs the re-registration act because they are the 
only authority with the right to register traffic vehicles in Sweden.  
If the problem is explained based on social ontology, a number of interesting features are exposed. For 
example, it shows that the license number on the license plate is only a representation of the original 
traffic vehicle object, and thus a copy of the license number stored in the CVR. The answer to the question 
of which of the two identifiers that is the genuine one, the one possessed by the burnt-out car or the blue 
Toyota, is, neither. They are both only copies of the genuine one. The burnt-out car obviously did not 
possess the genuine one, and the copy that was attached to the blue Toyota became useless when the 
traffic vehicle was deregistered and thus invalidated in the CVR. This proves that the genuine traffic 
vehicle object, with its license number, is stored in the CVR. Another important conclusion is that it was 
not untrue that the burnt-out car did have the license number KHH901. The problem was that it did not 
have the right to carry the license plate with the number KHH901, and this was not properly checked 
before the traffic vehicle was de-registered. By stealing the identifier the thieves could use the rights 
represented by the license number. They had not, however, assumed the responsibility associated with the 
institutional object represented by the license number (hence the parking tickets sent to Lars). It is 
important here to understand that the license number is an identifier of a traffic vehicle object, which is a 
constituent part of social reality with associated rights and obligations. Although such objects may have to 
match physical reality, such as in this case—they are not simply objects that represent and correspond to 
things outside of the system. Identifying an object is a social interpretative process using rules in a certain 
institutional context. This is clearly illustrated by the stolen vehicle identifier example. The car breaker 
was successful in identifying the traffic vehicle when the traffic vehicle object was de-registered because 
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he was able to provide an identifier of a valid traffic vehicle object to the CVR in a correct way. Although 
the identification was successful in the sense that the car breaker could find an existing traffic vehicle in 
the CVR, the de-registration was certainly a mistake because the traffic vehicle object was not correctly 
matched with the right physical thing. Compare this to Lars who was unable do identify the traffic vehicle 
object after it had been de-registered although he had access to both a physical car and a license plate with 
the same number as the traffic vehicle object that had been de-registered. This shows that a necessary 
condition for the identification process is to be able to identify the traffic vehicle object in the database. 
But how then can this be the case? How can real-world objects and their genuine identifiers exist in 
information systems? How can identifiers represent rights and obligations, and how are real-world 
objects in general identified. In the next section we will address these questions explicitly. 
Identification and Identifiers 
As noted above, the representational view of information systems is closely related to dialectical 
materialism. In the following we contrast this view with social ontology, which is based on the works of 
Searle (2006) and Habermas (1979) but also incorporates ideas introduced by Eriksson and Ågerfalk 
(2010) that are central to information systems particularly. This discussion leads on to an exploration of 
the importance of institutional control for identification to work. 
A Representational View of Identification  
From a representational point of view, an IS should adequately represent “the meaning of the real-world 
system the information system is intended to model” (Wand & Weber, 1995, p. 206). The IS literature is 
week on explaining just what that real world actually is, but it is commonly described in terms of 
dialectical materialism based on Bunge (1977). According to Bunge (1977) there are two types of objects: 
concrete objects (which he refers to as “substantial individuals”, “material objects”, or “things”) and 
constructs (which he refers to as “conceptual”, “formal” or  “ideal” objects). Things have intrinsic 
(physical, substantial) properties, conceptual objects do not; they are characterized by attributes that 
humans define them to have. Such constructs are objects that are studied and created in logic, 
mathematics, and semantics (e.g. sets and categories). To quote Wand et al. (1999), “Any domain can be 
described in terms of concrete things and the linkages that exist among them. Therefore, we use the word 
‘thing’ to refer only to substantial individuals or concrete things. […] the notion of a concrete thing applies 
to anything perceived as a specific object by someone, whether it exists in physical reality or only in 
someone’s mind.” From this follows that “All attributes and relationships in a class represent properties of 
things in the class.” (Wand et al., 1999, p. 512)  An object is thus identified via its set of attributes, which is 
different from objects of any other class. According to Evermann and Wand (2005, p. 149), “No two things 
have exactly the same set of individual properties. Thus, properties can be used to identify things.” 
In keeping with Bunge (1977), Wand et al. (1999) refer to properties of concrete things as substantial 
properties, or simply properties and properties of objects (conceptual things) as attributes. A property can 
depend on one or more things. A distinction is made between intrinsic properties that depend on one 
thing only, and mutual properties that depend on two or more things. This is exemplified by saying that 
(Wand et al., 1999): 
• the height of a person is an attribute that represents an intrinsic property of a person;  
• a student number is an attribute that represents the mutual property of being a student at a particular 
university;  
• the name of a person is an attribute that does not represent any specific property, it is an attribute that 
stands for the person as a whole, if it is unique.   
Accordingly, class definitions are based on attributes that represent properties of things; i.e. substantial 
properties. Wand et al. (1999) admit that “At first glance, this implication is counterintuitive, as “name” 
and “key” are usually the first attributes of a thing to be identified. Rather, it indicates that they have no 
significance in modeling the world.” According to Evermann and Wand (2005, p. 149), “In an information 
system, we may not know or care about all properties and instead use artificial identification attributes to 
represent the set of identifying properties.” This means that an object is seen only as an identifiable thing 
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and since no two things have the same set of individual properties, attribute values of identifying 
properties are used for identifying objects. Identifiers can also be used for identifying objects. However an 
identifier is seen only as an artificial attribute that represents identifying properties. It conveys no 
meaning whatsoever. 
Social Ontology and Identification 
Speech-act theory (Searle, 1969; 1995, Habemas, 1979; 1984) has been used by to discuss how 
interpersonal relationships and the social world at large is constructed. Searle (2006) claims that the aim 
of speech-act-based social ontology is to make it clear that the social world is created by human actions 
and attitudes but at the same time has an epistemically objective existence and is part of the natural 
world. The fundamental question that Searle is asking is: How can such animals as ourselves create a 
“social” reality? It is an objective fact that a piece of paper can be money, that a living person can be a 
resident in a country, and that a physical moving thing can be a traffic vehicle. But these socially 
constructed, institutional objects can only exist in virtue of collective acknowledgment (Searle, 2006). 
These objects have deontic powers, by creating desire-independent reasons for action, based on 
responsibilities, rights, commitments and duties. In order to understand the notion of institutional 
objects it is important to understand the distinction between what Searle (1995, p. 27) terms “brute facts” 
and “institutional facts”. Essentially, the difference between the two is that brute facts concern physical 
things and their properties and only require the institution of language in order that the facts can be 
asserted; for example, the assertion “The vehicle is blue”. Institutional facts, on the other hand, require 
human institutions and language for their very existence. Something or someone can be money, a 
resident, or a traffic vehicle only insofar as it is represented as such in an inter-subjectively agreed upon 
manner. 
Institutional objects, their attributes and relationships, are examples of institutional facts. One way of 
creating institutional objects is by using explicit declarative speech acts. For example, a representative of 
SRA may performs this speech-act: “I declare this dark-blue car to be the traffic vehicle with the license 
number KHH901.” This speech act instantiates a Traffic Vehicle institutional object. In this case the 
speech act requires that there exists a physical dark-blue car that is named KHH901, otherwise the speech 
act is meaningless. However the creation of institutional objects does not always require that a physical 
thing exists. For example, a corporation can come into existence, but there need be no physical thing that 
is the corporation. Instead the decisive requirement is that there has to be some obligations, 
commitments, rights or duties, which can be declared and collectively recognized as an organization 
(Searle, 2006, p. 28; Habermas, 1988 p. 273-274). 
A fundamental insight of speech act theory is thus that language constructs are used not only to describe 
reality as it is. Using language also implies constructing social reality (Searle, 1995), and thus conceptual 
and institutional objects. A conceptual object (Eriksson and Ågerfalk, 2010):  
• is created via a language act at a certain point in time; 
• is self-representing because a language act is used for its creation;   
• is created with some kind of media, and thus has a physical representation, e.g.  in the form of sound 
waves, paper, steel plates or traces of a computer disc; 
• is created based on constitutive rules; 
• is an instantiation of a concept; 
• is something that is referred to in human communication; 
• conveys both semantic and deontic meaning; 
• represents brute and/or institutional facts. 
A conceptual object is an institutional object if it also fulfils these criteria (Eriksson and Ågerfalk, 2010): 
• represents rights, responsibilities, obligations, commitments or duties;  
• it is an instance of  a general institutional phenomena;  
• is collectively agreed upon in a social context. 
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According to Searle (1969), there are two ways to identify objects using language (there are two reference 
mechanisms); using a definite description (such as, Lars’ blue Toyota) or an identifier (such as, KHH901). 
This does not mean that an identifier is the same as a definite description, as assumed by the 
representational view of information systems. In fact, trying to present a definite description based on a 
set of identifying properties of a thing as the identity of the object would lead to the peculiar consequence 
that the meaning of the identifier would change if there were any change at all in the properties of the 
thing (Searle 1969). This means that the two expressions “Lars’ blue Toyota” and “KHH901” only pick out 
the same object in a specific use situation, for example, as long as Lars is the owner and as long as the car 
is blue. If they had exactly the same meaning, then the identifier would have a different meaning 
depending on how the attributes in the definite description changed over time. Thus it would not fulfil its 
referential function, i.e. to represent the existence of the object and the thing over time. It would also 
imply that we would only be able to refer to an object by describing it. But this is precisely what the 
identifier construct avoids and which makes it a very practical construct (Searle 1969, p. 172)  
It is true that in the case where the object also represents the existence of a physical thing the identifier 
has to be connected to attributes that represent properties of the physical thing. This is because we must 
be able to substitute the identifier for an identifying description in certain contexts of use. For example, if 
someone asks you which car is “KHH901”, assuming that they cannot see the license number, you could 
answer, “Lars’ blue Toyota”. In that sense the identifier has a semantic meaning, but it should not be seen 
as a strict definition of the identifier.  In case the identifier also represents an institutional object it also 
has a deontic meaning, because it represents rights and responsibilities. This is why they are of interest to 
steal; they give the thief the rights connected to the object without incurring the responsibilities. Of 
course, they do not give the rights to the thief in a legal sense. However, by using the stolen identity, the 
unsuspicious will likely assume that the possession of the identity equals such rights.  This also means 
that although the identifier is tied to the thing named, they are not the same. An identifier can only be an 
identifier by virtue of a genuine difference between the identifier and the thing identified: “If they are the 
same, the notion of naming and referring can have no application.” (Searle 1969, p.75). The identifier 
represents the existence of an object, and existence is not a property. This is not acknowledged in the 
representational view, which treats, for example, the license number as a mutual property between the 
physical vehicle and the SRA (Everman & wand, 2005).  
Identification and Institutional Control 
Based on the discussion above we can ask ourselves what really went wrong in the stolen vehicle identifier 
case. The representational way of explaining this could be to claim that it was wrongfully assumed that the 
license plates were attached to the right vehicle, i.e. that the license number was a mutual property of the 
burnt-out physical vehicle. Since the license number is a mutual property (between the car and SRA), a 
better choice, representationalists could argue, would have been to use the ISO-VIN, which appears to be 
an intrinsic property of the physical vehicle as suggested by Evermann & Wand (2006). Indeed the ISO-
VIN is described by many organizations as the automotive equivalent to human "DNA” or fingerprint 
(DMV 2011; P&S, 2011). Based on Wand and Wang’s (1996) recommendations for ensuring data quality, 
the garbling arising from having two vehicles with the same license number could be solved by making 
sure that the lawful states of the information system reflect the lawful states of the real-world system. This 
could be achieved if the ISO-VIN is regarded as the real identifying property of the vehicle. Traffic Vehicle 
could then be treated as a specialization of Vehicle that inherits the intrinsic property ISO-VIN. Traffic 
vehicles also have a mutual property (ownership) with a vehicle owner, since ownership can only be 
legally established (in Sweden at least) between a registered vehicle with a license number and an owner 
with a valid civic registration number or organization number. But this solution introduces new problems 
because it suggests that license numbers depend on ISO-VIN numbers in a rather counterintuitive way. 
For example, since the ISO-VIN was first officially described in ISO Standard 3779 in February 1977, and 
revised in 1983 all physical things that are classified and registered as traffic vehicles do not possess ISO-
VIN numbers. This means that the traffic vehicle class cannot be a subclass of the vehicle class. The 
reason is that a subclass must possess the properties possessed by all things in the super-class (Wand  al., 
1999), and the traffic vehicle class requires the property license number but not the property ISO-VIN. 
Arguably, this does not properly represent how the ISO-VIN and license number are related. The reason is 
that the representational view fails to recognize how objects are identified and the special meaning of 
identifiers. Based on social ontology we can argue that the license number and ISO-VIN are not properties 
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at all because they are identifiers of two different institutional objects. It is clear that they are different 
institutional objects because the rules that govern their creation are completely different. The creation of 
the traffic vehicle object is governed by a statue (SFS 2001:650), and the ISO Standard 3779 governs the 
creation of the ISO-VIN. Furthermore the statue (SFS 2001:650)  does not require that the physical 
vehicle possess an ISO-VIN, and the standard that governs the creation of the ISO-VIN does not require 
that the vehicle possess a license number. The creation of the traffic vehicle object was described above 
and is done through CVR by the SRA. The ISO-VIN is created by vehicle manufactures and is created by 
the procedure described below.  
To start with there has to be a physical vehicle (a thing) that is typically created in a vehicle factory 
through material actions such as welding and assembling of parts. The ISO-VIN is usually applied to the 
vehicle in three different places. The build plate is fitted at the manufacturing plant, the compliance plate 
is fitted either at the manufacturing plant or, in the case of imports, at the holding yard, and the number 
is also stamped into the metal. However, these physical representations of the ISO-VIN should not 
primarily be understood as physical properties of the car, but as imprints of an institutional object. In 
many countries the original act is performed by use of an information system and the resultant 
institutional object is stored in the database of the vehicle manufacturer, or in a national VIN database 
(which is the case in, for example, Australia). A possible representation and instantiation of this act in a 
relational database is shown in Table 4. Here the action number identifies the whole declarative act (an 
institutional object). The action type describes the communicative intent of the object, the propositional 
content consists of the ISO-VIN, which identifies and describes the institutional object (Manufactured 
Vehicle), which consist of the ISO-VIN parts VIS, WMI and VDS. 
 
Table 4: Manufactured Vehicle Table 
Action  ID Date of action Action type WMI VDS VIS 
1123989899 2007-03-01 Registration SB1 KV56E8 0F000386 
 
Notice that it is only the VMI part, which represents the Car Manufacturer, together with the VIS part that 
is necessary to make the ISO-VIN unique. The VDS section contains a coded description of the vehicle 
making the whole ISO-VIN a complete institutional object.  The physical genuine representation is traces 
on a computer disc. The syntax of the institutional object is defined by the structure of the table. The 
semantic meaning of this object is that it is true that there exists a thing (a physical vehicle) that has 
properties that correspond to the attribute values represented by the VDS column. The deontic meaning 
should be understood as a commitment made by the manufacturer that this is a genuine vehicle 
authorized by the manufacturer. This is of great importance for a number of reasons. For example, the 
information in the Manufactured Vehicle table (Table 4) together with the ISO-VIN stamped onto the 
vehicle can be used to make it more difficult for criminals to attach an ISO-VIN from a wrecked car to a 
stolen car in order to “re-birth” it. Car thieves do this because selling a car with an ISO-VIN that has been 
reported stolen is almost impossible. It is therefore important also to keep a record of another type of 
declarative act, namely deregistration of the ISO-VIN numbers of wrecked cars, thus invalidating these 
institutional objects. As pointed out by Executive Director of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Reduction 
Council in Australia, Ray Carroll (2000), “An accurate and reliable VIN system is the cornerstone of all 
the procedures being implemented to stop re-birthing”. The registration and deregistration of an ISO-
VIN, and associating it with a physical vehicle is thus an extremely important declarative act that must 
follow strict procedures. 
Discussion 
The examples with the ISO-VIN and the license number show two things. First, constructs such as the 
ISO-VIN number and the license number are neither intrinsic nor mutual properties. They are identifiers 
of institutional objects. Second, the creation and management of institutional objects require strict 
institutional procedures. In order for institutional objects to be valid, they have to be instantiated 
following certain institutional rules. The identity of an object, even if it involves a physical thing, is 
established and verified in a social and interpretative process where its validity has to be controlled and 
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maintained over time. That is, an identity management system for institutional objects has to be 
established. Essentially, for any information infrastructure, and even society, not to break down, there has 
to be constitutional rules and routines that govern the creation, invalidation, and destruction of 
institutional objects. 
This points to one of the things that clearly went wrong in the case of Lars’ stolen vehicle identifier. The 
institutional control of de-registration of traffic vehicles was not sufficient to avoid de-registration of an 
unsuspicious vehicle. Here it is important to recognize that each of the four central actions involved 
different actors, and thus institutions with different responsibilities: A-1 concerned Lars and the police, A-
2 concerned Lars and the SRA, A-3 concerned the car breaker and SRA, and A-4 concerned the insurance 
company, SRA, and Lars. To manage, and possibly to change, the institutional control process in this case 
thus involves a number of design decisions regarding responsibilities, actions, and possible information 
sharing between governmental agencies. For example, future problems of this kind can be mitigated by 
implementing an institutional control routine within the CVR that prevents car breakers from 
deregistering traffic vehicles when several license plates with the same license number have been issued. 
Essentially, the responsibility for deregistration should in these cases be transferred explicitly to SRA, 
who should contact the owner to have them report whether or not they still use the license number. A 
problem with many identity management systems is that they do not involve the owner of the institutional 
object who can verify the status of the identifier (LoPucki, 2001). Thus, A-3 should involve also the traffic 
vehicle owner. This could be straightforwardly implemented as an on-line service in CVR. This changed 
design of the CVR emphasizes that the responsibility for deregistering traffic vehicle objects is that of 
SRA, not car breakers. It also emphasizes that the responsibility of the police is to investigate reportedly 
stolen goods, and that A-2 consequently should not be considered as part of the de-registration problem. 
Likewise, A-4, which is triggered by a deregistration act, is prevented if A-3 is properly managed as 
suggested by the proposed institutional control routine. 
In the case of the stolen vehicle identifier using only the license number to identify the institutional object 
associated with the burnt-out car was insufficient. From a representational view, this could have been 
explained by saying that the license number is a mutual property and that the ISO-VIN should have been 
used instead since it can be seen as an intrinsic property of the car. However, the re-birthing example 
clearly shows that neither license numbers nor ISO-VIN numbers, conceived of as properties possessed by 
things in the real world, are sufficient in and by themselves to correctly identify objects. This echoes 
Searle’s message that an identifier is not a property, neither intrinsic nor mutual. An identifier stands for 
the object as a whole, not for the sum of its properties (Searle, 1969; Eriksson & Ågerfalk, 2010). That is, 
identifiers are used to represent the existence of institutional objects, and existence is not a property. The 
very concept of identity is in itself a social and institutional construct—a social fact that enables us to refer 
to other social and brute facts by using language (and information systems). From this follows that 
identification is not primarily to do with a correct mapping of a physical entity’s properties onto a 
conceptual representation of a domain. Rather, identification is concerned with institutional objects, 
which may or may not involve the establishment of a correspondence relationship to some physical entity 
(Eriksson & Ågerfalk, 2010). Correspondence relationships are not core to understanding identity and 
identification. Rather, the essence of identification lies in the validity of the institutional object identified. 
Establishing validity involves the institutional processes that creates, maintains and invalidates such 
objects. These processes rely on constitutive rules that regulate the existence of the objects. In cases where 
a correspondence relationship between the institutional object and a physical thing is required, such a 
relationship has to be maintained and be possible to verify. However, assuming that this correspondence 
always represents a true mapping from physical reality to IS is clearly misleading and nothing but an 
instance of Austin’s (1962) “descriptive fallacy”. Rather, the opposite is often the case. That is,a physical 
thing is declared to have an identity and this declarative act is performed using an information system. 
Institutional objects are increasingly instantiated and maintained within information systems as the 
original and genuine facts to which the physical world should retain some fidelity. Institutional objects 
represent also rights and responsibilities, which cannot be empirically inferred from a physical thing. This 
means that the important question to ask is whether or not a thing is allowed to use a particular identifier 
and thus claim a normative relationship with a specific institutional object. Whether or not it is true that 
the thing is in possession of the identifier is subordinate. 
Institutional control of institutional objects and their identifiers is fundamental to understanding the 
nature of identity and identification in information systems. Institutional objects are an important 
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constitutional component of the social world. That these objects are increasingly created and maintained 
within information systems implies that information systems are an increasingly important part of the 
“real world”. Certainly, from a semiotic point of view, institutional objects are signs and as such exist also 
physically in some form (Stamper, 2001). However, an institutional object does not relate to a physical 
thing in the same sense as it relates to the physical medium that carries and stores it. The physical 
manifestation of institutional objects is typically in the form of stored data on magnetic disks in a 
computerized information system. However, institutional objects are socially constructed facts that 
represent rights and obligations related to the social and material world. Sometimes also physical 
imprints outside the system represent institutional objects, for example, the ISO-VIN or the license 
number attached to a physical vehicle. Understanding identification in terms of the relationship between 
institutional objects, identifiers and physical things is increasingly important with the digitization of 
society where RFID technology and sensor networks connect things in automated processes. The 
development of the so-called Internet of things (ITU, 2005) is further evidence of this trend. 
Conclusion 
Our analysis reveals a number of important insights in relation to identification in an information systems 
context.  
First, information systems and the information they contain are an important part of the real world. This 
implies that the representational view of information systems with a sharp distinction between the real 
world on the one side and the information system and its representations on the other cannot be 
maintained.  
Second, identifiers generated within information systems are not merely meaningless technical constructs 
(surrogates) that represent the natural key or the set of identifying properties that actually identifies the 
thing in the real world outside the system. These identifiers are often the genuine ones and carry both 
semantic and deontic meaning, which makes them valuable and susceptible to theft and misuse. This is 
because they allow dishonest people to do things they should not be granted, while at the same time 
avoiding associated responsibilities.  
Third, the identification of objects is not a scientific process. It is meaningless to try to define universal 
criteria for valid identification based on true empirical observations of brute facts alone. The designer of 
information systems, and associated identity management systems, has to deal with how information 
systems and institutional control routines are designed in an integrated manner and how the world ought 
to be. With goals, “oughts” and institutional contexts the tensions between normative and descriptive is 
introduced (Simon, 1969). A major problem with the representational view of information systems is that 
it excludes the normative and concerns itself solely with descriptions of the real world. This is insufficient 
for understanding how objects are identified and identities are verified. 
Fourth, since “identity” is, in itself, a social construct with material consequences, the process of 
identification depends on the institutional context in which the objects to identify exist as valid 
institutional facts.  
Fifth, the definition and allocation of identifiers, including institutional objects and possible claims to 
correspondence, is an institutional, and thereby social and political, process. Essentially, identifiers and 
institutional objects form critical boundary objects that mediate between different communities of 
practice and enable shared social worlds. A strict representational view cannot properly support IS 
development given this context since “Conflict and multiplicity are often buried beneath layers of obscure 
representation.” (Bowker and Leigh Star, 1999, p. 47). 
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